What is the EAAN?

Philosopher Alvin Plantinga formulated the Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism (EAAN). It aims to show that the conjunction of naturalism and evolutionary theory is epistemically self-defeating. Plantinga’s argument contends that if naturalism (the belief that only natural causes and entities exist) and evolution (a process favoring survival and reproduction) are correct, then human cognitive faculties are shaped solely by their survival value rather than their ability to produce true beliefs. If this is the case, we have no reason to trust our cognitive faculties, undermining all beliefs—including belief in naturalism.

C.S. Lewis’s Argument from Reason aligns with Plantinga’s argument by asserting that if human reasoning is wholly the product of non-rational natural processes, then we have no reason to trust it. Lewis argues that if our thoughts are merely the outcome of materialistic causation, there is no rational basis for believing that they track truth rather than simply being the result of blind evolutionary forces. He suggests reason requires a non-naturalistic explanation that transcends mere evolutionary conditioning and points toward a rational order beyond nature. This view challenges the naturalist assumption that evolution alone can produce reliable cognition.

As a Christian theist, Both Plantinga’s and Lewis’s arguments appealed to me because they act as defeaters against naturalism—a view I already rejected. I also see the source of all reason, the Logos, as a reality. Therefore, reason exists beyond the material order instead of being merely a product of it. In other words, I have a confirmation bias regarding the EAAN. However, one must be honest about the persuasiveness of an argument, even if we prefer the conclusion.

Are There More Falsehoods Than Truths?

A central aspect of Plantinga’s argument assumes that there are vastly more false beliefs than true beliefs available to any cognitive system. He argues that evolutionary pressures favor adaptive behavior over truth, making our beliefs potentially unreliable. In other words, if a falsehood ensures survival, natural selection does not prioritize, or even care, whether we choose that falsehood over a truth that offers similar benefits.

However, the claim that falsehoods vastly outnumber truths in a way that impacts survival is questionable. While it is true that there are infinitely many false statements and infinitely many true ones (as seen in mathematical propositions), the relevant issue is whether, in any given finite set of beliefs a cognitive agent might entertain, there are substantially more falsehoods than truths.

Combinatorial Explosion of Falsehoods

For any given proposition about the world, there is usually only one or a small number of ways for it to be accurate, while there are countless ways for it to be false. For example, the proposition “Water freezes at 0°C under standard pressure” is true in specific conditions, whereas there are more incorrect temperature-pressure combinations where this is false. While reality constrains what is true, imagination allows for near-infinite conceptual possibilities, most of which are untrue. A cognitive agent can generate unlimited hypotheses, but only a fraction will correspond to reality.

However, we do not know how our cognitive faculties process environmental observations into a working set for consideration from the set of all possible beliefs. Regarding evolutionary pressure, a cognitive agent does not consider mathematical precision or endless counterfactuals. Instead, the agent tries to make sense of the world to survive. On this front, our mental faculties do a pretty good job. Ask yourself: Are most of my survival beliefs false? We likely think not.

Of course, this is where Plantinga would say, “Of course! There is something beyond the material that gives us the necessary edge to obtain truth.” I may even agree with this. But this is arguing in a circle. It’s the very question we are trying to answer! Plantinga assumes counterfactually: if naturalism were the case, our beliefs would be predominantly false. However, the skeptic will respond, “Naturalism is the best explanation, and our beliefs are predominantly true.” So, something convincing is needed to show that false beliefs must dominate a cognitive system under naturalism. I’ve seen no good argument for this. There are good reasons to believe the opposite.

Truth Works: The Role of Veridical Beliefs in Survival

If a belief guides behavior, then its accuracy has direct survival implications. This connection is especially evident in what evolutionary biologists call the “Four Fs” of survival: fighting, fleeing, feeding, and reproducing. Incorrect beliefs about threats, food sources, or mating behaviors are selected against even if a false belief might initially lead to the correct survival action. But why, if one obtains a survival action initially given a falsehood? Because our cognitive web of beliefs also has an aspect of coherence.

For instance, consider a primitive hominid named Ned who encounters a lion. If Ned believes the lion is dangerous (a true belief), he will flee or take defensive action. If he holds a false belief—e.g., the lion wants to play tag—he is less likely to survive in the long run because, over time, falsehoods become problematic when conjoined. As the number of false propositional beliefs grows, the coherence of the belief system erodes.

The Fragility of a False Belief Network

Suppose Ned accumulates a network of interrelated false beliefs in addition to believing the game of tag falsehood:

  • When he sees a lion again, he must assume that playing the game is not optional, even when he is not in the mood.
  • When he sees the lion kill his friend, he must believe that the lion has a special grudge against that particular individual.
  • When he sees the lion kill other animals, he must believe the lion is a selective predator uninterested in hominids like himself.

Each new observation necessitates additional false beliefs to maintain coherence, making the system increasingly fragile. The problem is that falsehoods accumulate inconsistencies, requiring more ad hoc justifications. We have all experienced how telling the truth is computationally easier than lying. A lie often requires more lies to maintain it. In contrast, a single true belief—”The lion is a dangerous predator“—coheres easily with other true beliefs about predatory behavior and survival strategies. No further ad hoc coherent falsehoods are needed to sustain it.

The Evolutionary Advantage of Truth

Truthful beliefs provide an adaptive advantage because they do not require a convoluted network of supporting-falsehoods. Veridical beliefs about physics, predators, nutrition, and social interactions enhance survival. While occasional false beliefs can persist if they incidentally lead to adaptive behavior, a cognitive system systematically favoring falsehoods over truths would be inherently unstable.

In summary, Plantinga’s EAAN rests on an exaggerated claim about the number of false beliefs relative to true beliefs and underestimates the degree to which evolution favors cognitive reliability and coherence. While evolutionary processes do not guarantee perfect reasoning, they do select truth-tracking mechanisms because reality-based beliefs directly impact survival and reproductive success, as well as cohere more readily with other truths. Thus, the conjunction of evolution and naturalism does not undermine the reliability of human cognition.

Finally, where would the EAAN be helpful? It is too complex and esoteric for many people. For the skeptic who holds to naturalism, they will not find this argument persuasive at all. They already accept naturalism and the reliability of their beliefs—the conjunction the EAAN depends on. So then all that is remaining are intellectual theists who already reject naturalism for many other better reasons. As a Christian theist, I understand the appeal of this argument. But when considered honestly, I do not find it convincing.

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